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Olaf MERTELSMANN, Der stalinistische Umbau in Estland. Von der Markt- zur
Kommandowirtschaft. Hamburg : Kovač, 2006, 303 p. (Hamburger Beiträge zur
Geschichte des östlichen Europa, 14)
1 The first economic plan for the Estonian Socialist Republic was issued in December 1940
under chaotic circumstances. A local organization of the planning agency Gosplan had just
been founded and was working under the direction of a trustworthy party worker from
Moscow. Nevertheless, most of its workers had little experience in Soviet style economy,
work  was  done  in  a  hodgepodge  way,  economical  institutions  were  repeatedly
reorganized  and  the  state  officials  had  a  hard  time  understanding  the  Russian
instructions from Moscow. In a letter to the Estonian Council of Peoples Commissars even
the most important word –industry– had to be translated into Estonian in a handwritten
margin  note.  A  vivid  description  of  the  first  Soviet  year  at  the  beginning  of  Olaf
Mertelsmann’s  book  already  makes  clear,  that  although  the  Baltic  States  were
incorporated into the economic system of the Soviet Union, it took some time for them to
adjust to the standards already established in the old Soviet republics. According to the
author,  the party leadership followed the aim of  sovietization with a trial  and error
method. The special situation of the newly acquired territories that were reoccupied in
1944, and the resulting differences to the rest of the union, make the book an interesting
read.
2 However,  Mertelsmann’s focus is broader.  Although the book is merely a preliminary
study, he aims at giving an overview of the entire process of sovietization of the Estonian
economy:  population  growth,  agriculture,  the  standard  of  living  and  even  the  often
neglected sphere of service. Drawing on writings by P. Gregory and others Mertelsmann
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prefers the terms « command economy » or « managed economy » to the term « planned
economy » common in German, since the means to actually implement a central plan was
limited. Showing how economy really worked, the author inevitably repeats observations
that have been made with respect to the old republics of the Soviet Union. For instance, it
is hardly surprising that union-wide phenomena like deficits, the autarchy of regions and
enterprises,  or  practices  like  shadow  economy,  illegal  methods  of  procurement  or
personalised power relations and a great deal of improvisation can also be found in the
post-war industry in Estonia. The same goes for the factors leading to a low standard of
living, especially the negligible wholesale prices for agricultural products, the prohibition
of market relations and the focus on heavy industry. Although by including memories
and other  non-statistical  material  in  the  description of  the  economical  development
Mertelsmann’s book gains a certain local flavour (and also a great amount of readability),
it is not always clear, what was specific about the Estonian case.
3 This  is  not  to  say,  that  the  author has  nothing  new to  offer.  Especially  the  careful
evaluation  and  correction  of  the  often  dubious  statistical  material  is  not  to  be
underestimated. Of course, historians have previously had more than a hunch that the
statistical  material,  proving  for  instance  a  breathtaking  pace  of  industrialization  in
Estonia after the war, could not be taken at face value. But Mertelsmann pins down in
detail, how fictional plan-fulfillment, hidden inflation and fixed prices as well as outright
falsifications could be the basis of such statistics.
4 In  addition  to  the  above,  Mertelsmann  takes  a  firm  stand  in  some  of  the  most
controversial issues concerning the industrialization in the Baltic States. For instance, on
the  grounds  of  the  internal  balance  of  trade  from  1944  to  1948,  that  shows  heavy
investments in the small republic, he rejects the notion of Estonia having been a victim of
some kind of  colonial  exploitation and sees  it  rather  as  a  victim of  failed economic
policies.  Also,  he argues that the mass immigration of Russian speaking workers into
Estonia was not planned by the state,  but happened spontaneously as a result of the
famine in Russia. The central power, Mertelsmann states, would not have been able to
effectively implement such a policy.
5 This last point is an important one, but it also shows that an exclusively socioeconomic
argumentation can have its shortcomings. After all, the state might nevertheless have
been interested in this development, as the widespread propaganda about the leading
role of Russian culture in the forties suggests as well as the privileges that were granted
for the immigrants.
6 This danger of a reductionistic account also appears with regard to other topics.  For
instance,  Mertelsmann  convincingly  shows,  that  besides  imposing  a  non  effective
economic  system,  the  Communist  Party  made  some  grievously  wrong  decisions
concerning the direction of the Estonian economy. Thus, the allocation of vast sums into
the north-eastern Estonian oil shale industry proved to be a misinvestment in the long
run, due to the inferior material.  But the author makes no attempts to explain these
decisions as a part of an ideology of heavy industry, that sometimes seems to have gone
beyond rational considerations.
7 Mertelmann’s general tendency to factor out the political dimension seems especially
inappropriate,  when he tries  to  explain the  collectivization of  agriculture  in  Estonia
exclusively  as  an  attempt  to  exploit  the  countryside  and  pump  the  money  into
industrialization. In doing so, the author ignores not only the great amount of research
that denies this  effect  and stresses the political  motives for collectivization,  but also
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doesn’t take into account the new situation after the war, when the Soviet leaders knew
from experience what the economical outcome of collectivization would be like. If the
Bolsheviks thought in the late 1920, that profit could be made through collectivization – a
claim, that can been questioned – they had no reason to still believe this after the war.
Why they repeated the collectivization drive anyway is not a trivial question, and by
presupposing  simple  economical  reasons  Mertelsmann  avoids  going  deeper  into  the
subject.
8 Also, a couple of small shortcomings are surprising. The fact that he never explicitly
mentions  the  fourth  Five-Year  Plan  (1946–1950)  may  seem inadequate  in  a  book  on
command economy.  A  more  serious  omission  is  the  virtual  absence  of  the  currency
reform of December 1947 that is mentioned only once briefly. In fact, it was more than
just a means of fighting inflation – in regard to the whole Soviet Union it has been said,
that  it  « clearly  bore  confiscational  character »1.  In  the  newly  occupied territories  it
furthermore functioned as a politically and economically essential step to eliminate the
remains of the free market. In the same vain, Mertelsmann doesn’t pay much attention to
the unification of small enterprises and collective farms to large scale unions in 1950.
These were in fact an important step in destroying the old structures that had survived
even in the kolkhoz system. For many, they appeared to be a « second collectivization ».
9 In  the  last  chapter,  the  author  engages  in  a  little  bit  of  counterfactual  historical
speculation, making clear once more, that the very collectivization, in addition to low
prices  for  agricultural  products,  as  well  as  the  misallocation  of  capital  into  the
unproductive oil shale industry,  stand out as the main reasons for the bad economic
performance  of  Soviet  Estonia  in  the  post-war  years.  These  errors,  Mertelsmann
maintains,  could have been avoided even within a  Soviet  framework,  whereas as  an
independent country Estonia would even have had the chance to perform – as the author
puts in a strangely Soviet-like formula – a « leap into the first league of the developed
industrial nations. » (p. 269)
10 In spite of the above criticism the overall  evaluation of the book clearly has to be a
positive one. It is the first post-Soviet attempt to provide an overview over the economic
sovietization in Estonia. And in contrast to many other overviews it is mainly based on a
wide range of archival sources. It is true, the statistical work inevitably suffers from a
certain amount of incredibility of the sources and can sometimes be done only by means
of small case studies. However, Mertelsmann uses the quantitative material in a cautious
way and juxtaposes it with a great amount of narrative statements that give insight into
the daily practices of the Soviet economy. The outcome is a very readable and useful
account of the Soviet command economy in Estonia.
NOTES
1.  O.  Chlevnjuk,  « Die  sowjetische  Wirtschaftspolitik  im  Spätstalinismus  und  die  Affäre
‘Gosplan’ », Osteuropa, 9, 2000, p. 1031–1047, here: p. 1035.
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